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THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE OF THE
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
Howard E. Wallint

t

In recent years the Supreme Court has expanded the plain view exception to the warrant requirement by relaxing the prior valid intrusion
and the inadvertency requirements. This article examines the resulting
confusion in the state courts and identifies areas where judicial clarification is needed.
INTRODUCTION

I.

The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ... , shall not
be violated." 1 A second clause directs "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." 2 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted these two
provisions to mean that any search and seizure conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable and that evidence acquired from a warrantless
search and seizure is inadmissible at trial. 3 This exclusionary rule, however, has been eroded steadily by the Court's creation of various exceptions to the warrant requirement. Prominent among these is the plain
view exception, first articulated by the Court in 1971 in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire. 4 Although the plain view doctrine as first formulated consisted of rigid requirements, the Court no longer requires strict compliance with these requirements. Consequently, the scope of the plain view
doctrine is uncertain. This article discusses the original formulation of
the plain view doctrine, traces the modification of its various elements,
and discusses the confusing results generated by Maryland appellate
courts in applying the doctrine.

t

t
l.
2.
3.

4.

LL.B., 1965, University of Maryland School of Law; Associate Professor of Law,
University of Baltimore School of Law.
The author would like to express his appreciation to his secretary, Mrs. Martha T.
Kahlert, for her patience and good humor.
U.S. CaNST. amend. IV.
/d.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See also United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 701 (1983); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). Other recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement include: inventory searches, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); search incident to arrest, Chime! v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969); hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); and the Carroll doctrine (otherwise known as the automobile exception), Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Except for a brief discussion of the Carroll doctrine,
infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text, these exceptions are beyond the scope of
this article.
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PLAIN VIEW UNDER COOLIDGE V. NEW HAMPSHIRE

Traditionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that a seizure of
property occurs when the government significantly interferes with an individual's possessory interest in his property. 5 Seizure of property is permissible only when pursuant to either a warrant or one of the clearly
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. 6 In Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 7 a plurality of the Court fashioned one of the principal exceptions to the warrant requirement. 8 The Court held that incriminating
evidence is admissible at trial even if obtained without a search warrant if
three requirements are satisfied: (1) the initial police intrusion must be
valid, 9 (2) discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent, 10 and (3) it
must be immediately apparent to the police that the evidence is
incriminating. 11
The prior valid intrusion element is satisfied when the search arises
either from a judicial warrant or is justified by one of the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 12 The plain view doctrine, how5. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Place, 462 U.S. at 710 (Brennan, J., concurring); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
6. Place, 462 U.S. at 701.
7. 403 u.s. 443 (1971).
8. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,469-71 (1971). In Coolidge, pursuant to
a warrant, police seized and searched an automobile for evidence implicating its
owner in a murder. Because the warrant was later held to be invalid, the state
attempted to justify its action under several different exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the plain view doctrine. /d. at 464.
9. /d. at 465-66.
10. /d.
II. /d.
12. The Coolidge Court offered the following illustrations of warrantless prior valid intrusions. First, police may discover evidence inadvertently while in "hot pursuit" of
a fleeing suspect. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465. The Court cited Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967), as the prototype of the hot pursuit exception to the warrant
requirement. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465. In Hayden, however, the warrantless hot
pursuit search was limited to hidden felons and hidden weapons. Hayden, 387 U.S.
at 298-300. Presumably, therefore, plain view seizures pursuant to hot pursuit warrantless searches are only valid when the hot pursuit search is for hidden felons or
hidden weapons.
A second example of warrantless prior valid intrusions is a search incident to
arrest, as limited by Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Coolidge, 403 U.S.
at 465. Under Chime/, the search is limited to the area within which the arrestee
could grasp a weapon or destroy evidence. Under Coolidge, however, evidence discovered by police in plain view outside of the area under the immediate control of
the arrestee is also admissible under the plain view doctrine. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
465 n.24.
The final category of warrantless prior valid intrusions consists of situations in
which police are not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently
come across an incriminating object. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466 (citations omitted).
See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (where co-owner of a duffel bag gave his
consent for a police search, evidence discovered inadvertently as to the other owner
admissible under the plain view doctrine); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234
(1968) (where departmental regulation required police to remove all valuables from
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ever, does not in and of itself justify the intrusion. 13 It only allows the
police to seize an item in plain view after validly entering the premises.
Although evidence exposed to open, public observation may provide police with probable cause to obtain a warrant, 14 it does not justify a warrantless intrusion absent exigent circumstances that would excuse the
procurement of a warrant.
The inadvertency element is satisfied when the discovery of the evidence is unanticipated. 15 The Court reasoned that requiring the police to
obtain a warrant under such circumstances would be a needless inconvenience, and perhaps dangerous to the preservation of the evidence and
to the police themselves. 16 The plain view exception does not legitimize a
warrantless seizure if the police have ample opportunity to obtain a valid
warrant, and know the description and location of the evidence in
advance. 17
Finally, the Court in Coolidge added the requirement that it must be
"immediately apparent" to the police that the objects seized are incriminating evidence. 18 Without this requirement, the Court feared searches
would become "general or exploratory," in contravention of the Court's
policy that search warrants specify the objects sought with
particularity. 19
The plain view doctrine frequently is confused with two related
doctrines under which no warrant is required: the "open view" doctrine
and the "open fields" doctrine. These two doctrines are only relevant in
determining whether a search prohibited by the fourth amendment has
occurred as to activate the search warrant requirement. Under the open
view doctrine, no fourth amendment search occurs when an item is exposed to the general public in open view. 20 Under the open fields doc-

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.

impounded vehicles and, pursuant to this regulation, the officer discovered an incriminating registration card, warrantless seizure held constitutional under the plain
view doctrine); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (where undercover
agent was invited into the home of an unsuspecting drug dealer, evidence discovered
inadvertently admissible under the plain view doctrine); Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23 (1963) (where police were inside the home to arrest the defendant and inadvertently discovered evidence incriminating defendant's wife during a search incident
to that arrest, evidence admissible under the plain view doctrine).
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468. As the Coolidge Court stated: "Plain view alone is never
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." /d.
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,497 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 13-15 (1948).
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469.
/d. at 470.
/d. This inadvertency requirement prompted dissenting opinions by Justices Black
and White. Justice Black criticized the requirement as being contrary to existing
precedent. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 506 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice White stated
that the inadvertency requirement was "a punitive and extravagant application of
the exclusionary rule." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting).
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.
/d.
Under the open view doctrine, police observation of contraband is not a search for
fourth amendment purposes if the incriminating evidence is exhibited to the public
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trine, no fourth amendment search occurs when an item IS m an open
field beyond the curtilage of the defendant's house. 21 In contrast, the
plain view doctrine applies only after it is determined that a fourth
amendment search has occurred and serves to excuse the seizure of the
evidence without a warrant.

III.

SUPREME COURT'S MODIFICATION AND
APPLICATION OF THE PRIOR VALID INTRUSION
AND INADVERTENCY ELEMENTS
OF PLAIN VIEW.

As a plurality decision, Coolidge was destined to suffer modification
by subsequent decisions. In particular, more recent cases have modified
the prior valid intrusion and inadvertency requirements. 22
because in such situations it is presumed that the owner does not intend to conceal
its presence. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9 n.S (1982). The observation
may provide the officer with probable cause to obtain a search warrant, but it does
not give the officer the authority to enter the premises and seize the goods without a
warrant. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497 (1958); Johnson v. United States,
333 u.s. 10, 13-15 (1948).
For examples of open view observations outside the purview of fourth amendment protection, see Sumdum v. State, 612 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Alaska 1980) (observation of motel room by police when motel manager opened door to check on room
after checkout time); People v. Arroyo, 120 Cal. App. 3d 27, 31, 174 Cal. Rptr. 678,
680 (1981) (observation of marijuana plant in defendant's patio area viewed from
common carport area); State v. Rickard, 420 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 1982) (where
there is no intrusion, the warrantless observation is "a legally permissive 'open
view'"); State v. Dickerson, 313 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 1981) (observation through
window in farmhouse door); Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 613, 292 A.2d 762,
770 (1972) (officers' observation of dormitory room through open door). State v.
O'Herron, 153 N.J. Super. 570, 575, 380 A.2d 728, 730 (1977) (observation from
vantage point off defendant's property); State v. Powell, 99 N.M. 381, 385, 658 P.2d
456, 458 (1983) (view into truck cab from public road); State v. Planz, 304 N.W.2d
74, 80 (N.D. 1981) (view of contraband on front seat of unattended car in public
parking lot); Cook v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 71, 73, 216 S.E.2d 48, 49 (1975)
(observation from street into defendant's automobile). Courts have held that an
individual has no expectation of privacy as to items in open view even when the
police must resort to aircraft to effectuate the open view observation. See State v.
Roode, 643 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Layne, 623 S.W.2d 629, 636
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 420, 570 P.2d 1323, 132829 (1977).
21. Under the open fields doctrine, a warrantless intrusion upon an open space outside
the curtilage of a home is not an unreasonable search proscribed by the fourth
amendment because open fields are not encompassed within the phrase "person,
houses, papers and effects." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1984).
The Court has held that an individual has no legitimate expectation that open fields
will remain free from warrantless intrusion by police, even when he erects fences
and posts "no trespassing" signs. /d. at 182-83.
22. The third element, the immediately apparent requirement, is less controversial. The
Court consistently has adopted the opinion that this requirement is satisfied only if
the police have probable cause to believe the item observed is incriminating evidence. See Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1153 (1987) (probable cause is the
standard for immediately apparent and "to say otherwise would be to cut the 'plain
view' doctrine loose from its theoretical and practical moorings").
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Prior Valid Intrusion

Modification of the prior valid intrusion requirement began with
two Supreme Court cases decided more than a decade after Coolidge. In
Washington v. Chrisman, 23 the defendant's roommate was arrested on a
university campus for illegal possession of alcohol.2 4 The roommate,
accompanied by the arresting officer, returned to his dormitory room in
order to get proof of identity. While standing in the open doorway, the
officer noticed the defendant becoming nervous at the sight of the officer. 25 Seconds later the officer saw what he believed to be marijuana
seeds and a marijuana pipe on a desk inside the room. 26 The officer entered the room and confirmed that his perceptions had been accurate.
Both the roommate and the defendant consented to a search, which
yielded additional controlled substancesY The Supreme Court of Washington found that the warrantless entry and the seizure of the marijuana
pipe and seeds was unlawful. Furthermore, the court excluded the incriminating evidence because the consent was the fruit of an illegal
search. 28
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the initial seizure of the
marijuana seeds and pipe was valid under the plain view doctrine. 29 Because the officer had a right to accompany the arrestee into the dormitory room in order to preserve the integrity of the arrest, the officer was
permitted to confiscate contraband coming within his sight. 30 The defendant argued that the plain view doctrine was inapplicable because the
officer first chose to remain outside the room so that his observations
were made from outside the room. The Court responded that, regardless
of the officer's position with respect to the doorway, he had a right to
enter the room whenever he considered it essentiaP 1 The officer's right
to custodial control did not evaporate with his choice to hesitate in the
doorway rather than enter the room. 32 After he observed the seeds and
23. 455 u.s. 1 (1982).
24. In the recital of the facts it appears the officer "stopped" the defendant's roommate.
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 3 (1982). However, the opinion later states
that the roommate was "under lawful arrest." /d. at 6. Earlier, the Supreme Court
of Washington had approved the trial court's determination that the defendant had
been arrested. State v. Chrisman, 94 Wash. 2d 711, 716, 619 P.2d 971, 974 (1980)
(en bane), rev'd, 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
25. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 3.
26. /d. at 4.
27. /d.
28. State v. Chrisman, 94 Wash. 2d 711, 717-18, 619 P.2d 971,975 (1980), rev'd, 455
u.s. 1 (1982).
29. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 9. The Court succinctly described the doctrine: "The 'plain
view' exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when
it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be." /d. at 5-6.
30. /d. at 6-7.
31. /d. at 9.
32. /d. at 8-9.
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the pipe, he had a right to act. 3 3
Although Chrisman expands the scope of the plain view exception
by permitting the plain view observation to occur before the valid intrusion, it is consistent with Coolidge in upholding the essentials of the prior
valid intrusion requirement. The evidence in Chrisman was not observed
during the course of an ongoing constitutional search, but the officer was
vested nonetheless with the authority to conduct a warrantless entry
prior to his observation. The Court hastened to distinguish this case
from one where an officer, by chance, passes an open doorway to a residence and observes what he believes to be contraband inside the room. 34
In the latter situation the officer's open view observation would not provide him with any basis for intruding without a warrant. Chrisman is
significant, however, because it adds a new dimension to the plain view
doctrine. Where police are vested with the authority to enter premises
before the observation, ultimate entry is considered a prior valid intrusion. Thus, for the first time, the Court held that the plain view sighting
of incriminating evidence could justify an intrusion. 35
The Court further modified the prior valid intrusion requirement in
Texas v. Brown. 36 In Brown, an officer asked for the defendant's driver's
license at a routine driver's license checkpoint. The officer shined his
flashlight into the car and saw the defendant drop a knotted opaque
party balloon onto the seat. 37 Cognizant that narcotics frequently are
packaged in such balloons, the officer examined the automobile's interior
more closely and observed plastic vials, loose white powder, and an open
bag of party balloons. 38 After the driver admitted that he did not have
his driver's license, the officer instructed him to get out of the car. The
officer reached into the car, removed the knotted balloon, and displayed
it to a fellow officer. 39 The suspect was then arrested. 40 Subsequent tests
verified that the seized knotted balloon contained heroin. The Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the plain view doctrine was inapplicable because the incriminating nature of the balloon was not "immedi33. /d. at 9.
34. /d. at 9 n.S.
35. Justice White dissented, disagreeing with the majority's modification of the prior
valid intrusion requirement. /d. at 14 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued
that neither the officer's authority to remain at the arrestee's elbow nor his authority
to enter the room were sufficient grounds for validating the subsequent seizure. /d.
Because entry was made with intent to remove contraband observed prior to the
intrusion, the officer could not justify the seizure under the plain view doctrine. /d.
36. 460 u.s. 730 (1983).
37. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 733 (1983).
38. /d. at 734.
39. /d.
40. The state court opinion suggested that the driver was arrested for failing to produce
a current driver's license. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App.
1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). The Supreme Court was unable to endorse that
conclusion inasmuch as transcripts indicated that the defendant was arrested only
after the balloon was seized. Brown, 460 U.S. at 734 n.2.
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at ely apparent" to the arresting officer. 41 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, finding that Texas had adopted an unduly restrictive interpretation of the "immediately apparent" standard. 42 Brown is significant, however, not so much for its reversal on the immediately apparent
issue as it is for its discussion of the prior valid intrusion requirement.
Writing for the Brown plurality, Justice Rehnquist suggested that
the Coolidge characterization of plain view as an "independent exception" to the warrant requirement was somewhat inaccurate. 43 Justice
Rehnquist suggested that the plain view doctrine is better understood as
an extension of the officer's prior justification for access to the object
because "plain view" merely provides grounds for the seizure of the object. 44 In support of this contention, the Brown plurality first referred to
the well-settled rule from Payton v. New York 45 that illegal objects found
in public places may be seized by police without a warrant. 46 The Brown
Court acknowledged that there was a distinction between the Payton
public place and private premises. 47 Nevertheless, the plurality reasoned
that, when an officer has "prior justification" for an intrusion into the
premises, the owner's only remaining interest in the object is that of possession and ownership, 48 the same interest an owner has in objects found
in a public place under Payton.
The Brown plurality found that the officer's intrusion into the car
was valid even without a warrant based upon the "Carroll automobile
exception." 49 Under this exception, first articulated in Carroll v. United
States, 50 probable cause alone justifies the search of a lawfully stopped
vehicle, as well as its contents. 5 1 In Brown, the defendant's automobile
was stopped lawfully for a traffic check, the balloon was in the officer's
view, and the officer had probable cause to believe the car contained contraband. 52 Consequently, the officer's entry and search of the automobile
was a valid intrusion upon the defendant's privacy interests. Because the
balloon was found in plain view following a prior valid intrusion, the
Brown plurality concluded that the evidence was admissible under the
plain view doctrine.
According to the Brown plurality, the "Carroll automobile exception" is justified because an individual has a reduced expectation of pri41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Brown, 460 U.S. at 736.
/d. at 741-42.
/d. at 738.
/d. at 738-39.
445 u.s. 573 (1980).
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980).
Brown, 460 U.S. at 738.
/d. at 739.
/d. at 741 n.6. The Brown Court actually invoked the interpretation of the Carroll
automobile exception set forth in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
50. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
51. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
52. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742-43 (1983).
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vacy in his automobile. Because the state's interest in preventing an
item's disappearance always outweighs an individual's interest in the possession of that item while it is in his automobile, the item will be seizable
under the plain view doctrine as if it were publicly situated. 53 Under
Brown, the plain view seizure doctrine extends the officer's prior justification for seizing the object; it does not serve as an independent grounds
for warrantless seizures.
Unlike the classic Coolidge scenario where the discovery follows the
valid intrusion, the incriminating evidence in both Brown and Chrisman
was discovered before the prior valid intrusions. Brown, however, broadens the Chrisman rationale by permitting intrusions that arise after the
evidence is first discovered. The officer in Brown did not have probable
cause to enter the car until after he saw the balloon. Once he saw the
balloon, he had a right to enter the car under the Carroll search doctrine
and to seize the balloon under the plain view seizure doctrine. 54
This interpretation of the plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown is supported by the Court's analysis in two subsequent cases, Illinois v. Andreas55 and United States v. Jacobsen. 56 In Andreas, the Court upheld
the warrantless search of a table that was shipped from overseas. 57 Customs officials uncovered marijuana, which was tested by narcotics agents,
repackaged into the legs of the wooden table, and delivered to the defend53. This approach is suggested in a footnote in Brown on prior valid intrusion. Prior
valid intrusion may be by a search warrant or by an exception to the warrant requirement. Brown, 460 U.S. at 738 n.4. In the alternative, no justification is needed
when property is left in a public place. /d. In analogizing these two diverse situations, the Court attempted to equate the principles governing plain view seizures
with those governing seizures of items in public places. This analogy is somewhat
strained, however, because, as the Court recognized, the seizure of items in public
places does not implicate fourth amendment rights. /d.
54. Brown appears to conform with Coolidge at least to the extent of requiring that there
be some prior valid intrusion on the reasoning that plain view alone is insufficient to
justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468. Although
Justice Steven's concurrence in Brown does not conflict with this premise, one aspect of his plain view analysis merits further consideration. Justice Stevens states:
An object may be considered to be 'in plain view' if it can be seized without compromising any interest in privacy. Because seizure of such an object threatens only the interest in possession, circumstances diminishing
that interest may justify exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's usual requirements. Thus, if an item has been abandoned, neither Fourth Amendment interest is implicated, and neither probable cause nor a warrant is
necessary to justify seizure.
Brown, 460 U.S. at 748 (Stevens, J., concurring).
If no fourth amendment interest is implicated by the removal of abandoned
property, the action should not be considered a technical plain view seizure. No
prior valid intrusion is required when an owner consciously has relinquished any
privacy interest in the item. It may be, however, that Justice Stevens was referring
to "plain view" in its ordinary, nonlegal sense.
55. 463 u.s. 705 (1983).
56. 466 u.s. 109 (1984).
57. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 705, 767 (1983).
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ant. 58 Forty-five minutes after the defendant received the table, narcotics agents arrested him as he was leaving his apartment. 59 The agents
seized the table, promptly examined it, and discovered the marijuana
where they had left it after their initial search. 60
A majority of the Court reasoned that, just as a prior valid intrusion
of a house minimizes a homeowner's privacy interest in items that are in
plain view, the initial opening of the table minimized the owner's privacy
interest in its contentsY Justice Brennan dissented, rejecting the analogy
to the plain view s~izure doctrine. 62 He argued that there must be an
independent justification for breaching the individual's right to security
in his possessions, even where there is a reduced expectation ofprivacy. 63
Although the sending of a container through customs relinquishes one's
right to keep the contents secret, 64 that act alone is not a waiver of all
privacy interests. One retains the expectation that his possessions will
remain undisturbed. 65 Justice Brennan contended that when narcotics
agents reopen a delivered package they violate fourth amendment protections because they have no independent reason, aside from the earlier
administrative search, for invading the individual's privacy interests. 66
According to Justice Brennan, the plain view seizure doctrine was employed inappropriately to justify reopening the closed container without
a warrant. 67
Under similar facts, the Court in Jacobsen 68 held that the government examination of the contents of a package previously opened by
Federal Express employees did not violate any legitimate expectation of
privacy. 69 The majority reasoned that the earlier search by the Federal
Express employee was not a government search within the meaning of
the fourth amendment. Because the police were informed of the contents
of the package by a third party, they obtained probable cause to search
the package without invading a fourth amendment privacy interest. 70
58. /d. Common carriers have a common law right to inspect packages they accept for
shipment. See United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 399-400 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
When contraband is discovered, it is routine for common carriers to notify authorities. The arrival of police to confirm the presence of contraband is not a government
search subject to the fourth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 602
F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979).
59. Andreas, 463 U.S. at 767.
60. /d. at 767-68.
61. /d. at 771-72. With respect to the forty-five minute gap in surveillance, the Andreas
Court held that the warrantless seizure remains valid as long as there is no substantial likelihood that the contents of the container have been changed. /d. at 773.
62. /d. at 778 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. /d. at 779.
64. /d. at 776.
65. /d.
66. /d. at 789.
67. /d. at 780.
68. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
69. /d. at 126.
70. /d. at 115.
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Once the contents of the package were discovered by Federal Express,
the owner no longer had an expectation of privacy. 71
The application of the plain view doctrine in Andreas and Jacobsen
deviates from the original plain view formula. In both cases, personal
interests in privacy were compromised before a justified intrusion. In the
traditional plain view scenario, the breach of privacy occurs after a justified intrusion. The individual's possessions are fully protected by the
fourth amendment until a justified intrusion occurs. The subsequent observations of the individual's possessions are a reasonable violation of
privacy- permissible under the fourth amendment. Andreas and Jacobsen equate observations made in a constitutionally protected place with
observations made in public places. Those decisions reason that the intrusion on privacy is really not an intrusion because the intrusion itself
reduces the individual's expectation of privacy.
Although the Court allows plain view seizures based on a diminished privacy interest, an individual's expectation of privacy can be diminished only when there has been a justified intrusion into an
individual's constitutionally protected domain. Therefore, prior valid intrusion remains an indispensable element of the plain view doctrine, regardless of whether one agrees that plain view is applicable in
"diminished privacy interest" situations. Lamentably, however, the
Court has withdrawn from the strict, literal definition of prior valid intrusion. The result may well be increased criminal convictions. From
the perspective of constitutional rights, however, the relaxation of the
prior valid intrusion requirement is disconcerting.
B.

Inadvertency .

The inadvertency element of the plain view doctrine, like the prior
valid intrusion element, has become increasingly imprecise. Because the
plain view doctrine was espoused by only a plurality of the Court in Coolidge, several lower courts have regarded the Court's inadvertency discussion as dicta, 72 and some have questioned the binding effect of the
71. It is significant that in both Andreas and Jacobsen the examination of the interiors of
the respective containers revealed that they contained nothing but contraband. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120 n.l7. Any further expectations of privacy were therefore
less than legitimate. The Court conceded that a container which can support a
reasonable expectation of privacy may not be searched without a warrant, even on
probable cause. /d. Presumably, therefore, a container holding both contraband
and noncontraband could be searched only with a warrant.
Justice White concurred with the result in Jacobsen, but argued that a subjective expectation of privacy is not diminished by an unanticipated private search. /d.
at 132-33 (White, J., concurring). He also disagreed with the majority's assertion
that the criterion for privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as they
existed at the time the invasion occurred. /d. at 132.
72. See North v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 307-08, 502 P.2d
1305, 1308-09, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 836-37 (1972); State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707,
712, 518 P.2d 969, 974 (1974); State v. King, 191 N.W.2d 650, 655 (Iowa), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 908 (1971); State v. Mitchell, 300 N.C. 305, 310-11, 266 S.E.2d
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opinion. 73 Other courts have latched onto language in the opinion that
appears to exclude contraband, stolen goods, and dangerous items from
the inadvertency requirement. 74
Although most courts have accepted the inadvertency limitation on
a plain view seizure, 75 the degree of expectation necessary to make a po605, 609 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1085 (1981). The Supreme Court oflowa in
King mistakenly refers to the Coolidge plurality opinion as a "minority" opinion.
King, 191 N.W.2d at 655.
73. See United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1101 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 895 (1974); United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 931 (1974). One court has suggested that although inadvertence
may not be required for conventional seizures, it may be indispensable in an electronic surveillance context because those invasions are of a more insidious nature.
United States v. Pine, 473 F. Supp. 349, 358 (D. Md. 1978).
74. The plurality opinion states:
[T]o extend the scope of such an intrusion to the seizure of objects - not
contraband nor stolen nor dangerous in themselves - which the police
know in advance they will find in plain view and intend to seize, would fly
in the face of the basic rule that no amount of probable cause can justify a
warrantless seizure.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 472 ("this is not a case
involving contraband or stolen good or objects dangerous in themselves") (footnotes
omitted).
Justice White dissented, criticizing the "confusing and unworkable" distinction
between contraband and mere evidence. /d. at 519 (White, J., dissenting). For
cases interpreting Coolidge as inapplicable to contraband, see United States v.
Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 951-52 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d
1335, 1346 (4th Cir. 1981 ); United States v. Gorman, 637 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir.
1981); United States v. Vargas, 621 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 854
(1980); United States v. Cutts, 535 F.2d 1083, 1084 (8th Cir. 1976); State v. Slade,
116 N.H. 436, 439, 362 A.2d 194, 196 (1976).
In both Bellina and Vargas, the courts relied on the observation made in Lo-Ji
Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 n.5 (1979), that "contraband may be
seized without a warrant under the 'plain view' doctrine." Although the statement
is correct, it does not support the bald conclusion that inadvertency is not a requirement when contraband is involved. On the contrary, the Lo-Ji decision made it
clear that prior to the intrusion in that case, there was insufficient probable cause to
seize the pornographic contraband. !d. at 325. Because a search warrant could not
have been obtained, the seizure of contraband under the circumstances was, in fact,
inadvertent.
One prominent author complains that no explanation was offered for excluding
contraband, and stolen and dangerous goods from the inadvertency limitation; nor
is an explanation readily apparent. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.4(K), at
139-40 (1985). In Vargas, the Second Circuit suggested that inadvertence is not
required for a plain view seizure of contraband because under federal law, 21 U.S.C.
§ 88l(a)(l)-(3), there is no property right in controlled substances. Vargas, 621
F.2d at 56. This explanation is unappealing because expectations of privacy ordinarily are not defined by property interests. Some support for that concept may be
found, however, in more recent Supreme Court decisions that consider privacy interests in contraband less than legitimate. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 123 (1984).
75. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983); United States v. Liberti, 616
F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980); State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J.
25, 35, 397 A.2d 1062, 1066 (1979). See also LAFAVE, supra note 74, § 3.4(K).
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lice discovery inadvertent remains elusive. 76 The possibility that incriminating items will be discovered on the premises does not invalidate an
otherwise valid plain view seizure.7 7 On the other hand, where there is
probable cause to believe certain evidence will be found, many courts
have overturned warrantless seizures for lack of inadvertence. 78 Inasmuch as a warrant could have been obtained, evidence from a warrantless seizure is not admissible under the plain view doctrine.
In other jurisdictions, however, probable cause alone is not enough
to invalidate a plain view seizure. Even in situations where the officers
could have obtained a warrant, discovery can be deemed inadvertent if
the officers acted innocently and the procedure was not a mere subterfuge
to the warrant requirement. 79 Courts using this good faith standard consider the inadvertency requirement as a way of preventing police from
obtaining a warrant "in bad faith" or using plain view to "evade the
warrant requirement. " 80 If a warrant is sought in good faith, police
76. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 244 (1971).
77. See Liberti, 616 F.2d at 37; People v. Stoppel, 637 P.2d 384, 389-91 (Colo. 1981);
State v. Pepe, 176 Conn. 75, 79-80, 405 A.2d 51, 53-54 (1978); State v. McColgan,
631 S.W.2d 151, 155 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).
78. See United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cir. 1979); State v. Howard,
448 So. 2d 713, 718 (La. App. 1984); Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319, 326
n.6, 331 n.9, 409 N.E. 2d 719, 724 n.6, 727 n.9 (1980); Commonwealth v. Casuccio,
308 Pa. Super. 450, 469-70, 454 A.2d 621, 630-31 (1982).
If the inadvertency limitation on the plain view doctrine is to make any sense at
all, it must require that a discovery of objects not named in the search warrant
always be inadvertent. No attention should be given to the hopes or expectations of
the police. LAFAVE, supra note 74, § 3.4(K), at 139-40.
One jurist has aptly observed that "traditional roles on the issue of probable
cause" are oddly reversed under these circumstances because the defendant will
urge and the state disclaim the presence of probable cause. Liberti, 616 F.2d at 38
(Newman, J., concurring).
79. United States v. Johnson, 707 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Wright, 641 F.2d 602, 605-06 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021 (1981). In both
cases federal agents, in good faith, accompanied state officers during valid state
searches and seizures of drugs. Although in both cases, the Eighth Circuit conceded
that the federal agents could have obtained warrants for the items seized, the plain
view exception was held applicable.
In State v. Oliver, 341 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1983), the inadvertency requirement
was met where police had probable cause to include the magazines seized in their
application for a search warrant. The court reasoned there was no basis for finding
the magazines were omitted intentionally from the search warrant. The record had
established that the magazines were omitted from the warrant application due to an
oversight, and police were not looking for them. /d. at 746.
Jurisdictions viewing inadvertency as a means of deterring subterfuge may read
Coolidge as implying that the officers in Coolidge did not act in good faith. That
premise could be based on United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), in which the
Court recognized that a good faith exception to the warrant requirement could not
be invoked by police "where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial
role." /d. at 923. It could be argued that the officers in Coolidge should have realized that the warrant issued by a non-neutral magistrate was invalid and that the
ensuing entry was a subterfuge to the warrant requirement.
80. See Johnson, 707 F.2d at 321; Wright, 641 F.2d at 605-06; Oliver, 341 N.W.2d at
746.
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knowledge of what evidence might be discovered should not bar a plain
view seizure. 81
Although the good faith standard appears appropriate, the Coolidge
opinion does not support it. The seizure in Coolidge was authorized by a
warrant. 82 The warrant was invalidated, however, because it was issued
by a non-neutral magistrate. 83 In an attempt to bring the search and
seizure of the defendant's automobile under an exception to the warrant
requirement, the prosecution argued that the plain view doctrine was applicable. The Court disagreed because the discovery of the automobile
was not inadvertent inasmuch as the automobile and other evidence
seized were specifically listed in the warrant. 84
In jurisdictions permitting plain view seizures where the seized evidence was not listed in the warrant due to an oversight and police were
not expecting to remove the items, discovery of the evidence is considered inadvertent. This rationale appears to penalize police for their attempts to comply with the warrant requirement. In addition to
producing that rather curious anomaly, the requirement of inadvertency
is difficult to apply. Courts relying on a good faith criterion must examine the subjective intent of intruding officers. This determination entails inquiry into whether the failure to list the evidence was deliberate or
accidental, whether the invasion was undertaken with the expectation
that these objects would be seized, and whether all the officers were operating under the same misapprehension. A more practical guide for determining whether seizures are inadvertent is the familiar and workable
probable cause standard.
Controversy over the inadvertency requirement may hinge on a particular court's reading of the Coolidge plain view analysis. In Coolidge,
the Court reasoned that if a warrant fails to mention a particular object,
but police know the object's location and intend to seize it, there is a
violation of the constitutional requirement that a warrant particularly
describe the things to be seized. 85 Some jurisdictions may interpret
knowledge to mean that police must have known the exact location of a
particular item. Under those circumstances, discovery of the item would
not be inadvertent. 8 6
Other jurisdictons consider two elements to determine whether
there was "a planned warrantless seizure": (1) knowledge of the item's
location, and (2) intent to seize the item. 87 Under this interpretaton,
even if there is probable cause to obtain a warrant, removal of that object
81. See supra note 80. Presumaby all jurisdictions would agree that no plain view
seizure could be made where the warrant naming the seized article is later declared
invalid. See State v. Westfall, 446 So. 2d 1292, 1304 (La. App. 1984).
82. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U.S. 443, 447 (1971).
83. Id. at 453.
84. Id. at 472-73.
85. Id. at 471.
86. Id. at 472.
87. Id. at 471 n.27.

1987]

The Plain View Doctrine

279

may be inadvertent if the invasion is not for the purpose of seizing a
particular object.
Since Coolidge, Supreme Court decisions have offered no standard
for determining whether a seizure is inadvertent. Additionally, the
Court has not addressed the lingering doubts over whether inadvertency
is an indispensable element of the plain view doctrine. In Texas v.
Brown, 88 Justice Rehnquist noted that several lower court decisions
questioned the validity of the inadvertency requirement 89 and Justice
White wrote. a separate opinion specifically rejecting inadvertency as a
requirement of plain view seizures. 90 Justice Powell and Justice Black"
mun, on the other hand, saw no reason to cast doubt on the Coolidge
articulation of the plain view exception. 91 The three remaining Justices
offered no comment on the inadvertency requirement. 92
In Brown, the officer's view of contraband preceded his right under
the Carroll doctrine to enter and search the automobile's interior. Ordinarily, when police learn that evidence is located in a constitutionally
protected area, a warrant must be obtained prior to entry. Under the
Brown rationale, however, when police unexpectedly see evidence under
circumstances in which applying for a warrant might lead to the loss of
that evidence, a warrantless search and seizure is permissible. More specifically, if the warrantless invasion based on an inadverent observation
would satisfy the other requirements of the plain view doctrine, the invasion is valid. 93 Had the officer expected to find the drugs before he
stopped the car, the failure to obtain a warrant could not be excused. In
Brown, the inconvenience of obtaining a warrant prior to the intrusion
fulfilled the requirement that the discovery be inadvertent.
The Brown decision is flawed, however, because it fails to recognize
460 u.s. 730 (1983).
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 n.8 (1983).
/d. at 744 (White, J., concurring).
/d. at 746 (Powell, J., concurring). The fact that these two Justices appear to accept
the plain view doctrine as developed in Coolidge invalidates the justice-counting
theory proposed by the Fourth Circuit. United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097,
1101 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974). In Bradshaw, the court theorized that inadvertency was not required because three members of the Court disagreed with the inadvertency requirement (Burger, White and Blackmun) and two
new members shared the same view (Rehnquist and Powell); thus a Court majority
repudiating inadvertency was present. The theory is without foundation because
neither Justice Powell nor Justice Blackmun challenged the view of the Coolidge
plurality.
92. It is interesting to note that, although contraband was seized in Texas v. Brown, the
Court did not refer to the language in Coolidge that seemingly exempts contraband
from the inadvertency requirement. Jurisdictions adopting the view that contraband
need not be discovered inadvertently have not recognized the implicit rejection of
that interpretation in Texas v. Brown. See United States v. Hultgren, 713 F.2d 79,
88-89 (5th Cir. 1983); State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530,547,482 A.2d 300, 310, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1984); State v. Hobson, 8 Conn. App. 13, 18 n.7, 511 A.2d
348, 351 n.7 (1986); People v. Boyd, 123 Misc. 2d 634, 640,474 N.Y.S.2d 661, 667
(1984); see also State v. Cote, 126 N.H. 514, 527, 493 A.2d 1170, 1179 (1985).
93. Cf Brown, 460 U.S. at 743-44.
88.
89.
90.
91.
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that the evidence was not found inadvertently inasmuch as the invasion
was undertaken for the very purpose of seizing that evidence. Although
the seizure in Brown may well have been justified under the Carroll automobile exception, the lack of inadvertency takes the seizure outside the
parameters of the original plain view formula. Under Brown, the
seizures would be permissible under the plain view doctrine as long as the
circumstances prior to the intrusion make obtaining a warrant
impractical.
What emerges from Brown is a disturbing modification of the inadvertency requirement. In the classic plain view scenario depicted in Coolidge, a prior valid intrusion must precede the inadvertent discovery of
evidence. Chrisman extends Coolidge to situations where the inadvertent
discovery is made prior to the invasion, but after the officer was vested
with the authority to make an invasion. Brown suggests that the inadvertency requirement is satisfied simply if it would be inconvenient to obtain
a warrant. 94
IV.

A.

MARYLAND APPLICATION OF THE PRIOR VALID
INTRUSION AND INADVERTENCY
REQUIREMENTS
Prior Valid Intrusion

The confusion generated by the United States Supreme Court as to
the precise nature of the prior valid intrusion requirement has been complicated further in Maryland by inconsistent or incomplete appellate decisions. Although the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has
explained that plain view seizures are valid only if they are preceded by a
prior valid intrusion, 95 the court confused the plain view and open view
doctrines. 96 Moreover, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has failed to
94. Because, under Brown, an exigency arising prior to invasion satisfies the inadvertency requirement, Chrisman may be interpreted similarly. Obviously, it would have
been inconvenient for the officer in Chrisman who spotted contraband inside the
arrestee's dormitory room to obtain a warrant. Therefore, plain view is applicable
when an unanticipated discovery has been preceded by the right to intrude. As a
practical matter, this theory might validate plain view seizures which otherwise
would fail to satisfy Brown. For example, police arrive at a suspect's home armed
with a search warrant for Item A. Before entering or making their presence known,
the police spot the equally incriminating Item B displayed in the window. Under
Brown, obtaining a warrant for Item B would be inconvenient. Yet the discovery of
Item B is anticipated and therefore inadmissible under plain view. Pursuant to Chrisman, however, the discovery of Item B would be inadvertent for purposes of plain
view because Item B was observed after the police were already authorized to enter
the premises pursuant to the warrant for Item A. Courts have yet to consider the
legality of seizures under these circumstances.
95. Dent v. State, 33 Md. App. 547, 557, 365 A.2d 57, 63 (1976); Floyd v. State, 24 Md.
App. 363, 366, 330 A.2d 677, 679, cert. denied, 275 Md. 748 (1975); Neam v. State,
14 Md. App. 180, 185, 286 A.2d 540, 543 (1972).
96. Hutchinson v. State, 38 Md. App. 160, 380 A.2d 232 (1977), illustrates the confusion of the plain view and open view doctrines by the Court of Special Appeals of
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discuss the prior valid intrusion requirement altogether, despite being
provided with the opportunity to do so in Liichow v. State. 97
In Liichow, the defendant was told by a trailer park owner and by
the police to leave a trailer park because of his involvement in several
disturbances. 98 As the defendant was transferring his belongings into a
waiting car, an officer observed many white, dime-sized tablets at the
bottom of a large plastic bag. 99 The bag was seized and a subsequent
search revealed that the tablets were a controlled dangerous substance. 100
The defendant was convicted for the possession of narcotics but the court
of appeals reversed the conviction because the warrantless search was
unconstitutional. 101 The court held that the search could not be justified
under the plain view exception 102 because pharmaceutical companies
manufacture many white tablets that are not contraband and it could not
have been immediately apparent to the officer that the tablets were

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Maryland. In Hutchinson, a police officer stopped a car driven by an individual
whom the officer believed had just committed a felony. As he was arresting the
suspect, the officer observed a handgun and bullets in the back seat of the car. The
items were not seized until the car was at an impoundment lot. The court upheld
the search of the car and seizure of evidence on two separate grounds. First, the
Hutchinson court held that the exigent circumstances at the time of arrest gave the
officer probable cause to believe the car contained an instrumentality of the crime.
/d. at 171, 380 A.2d at 238. In offering a second ground on which to justify its
holding, however, the court confused the open view and plain view doctrines. The
court attempted to invoke the plain view doctrine, under which a search incident to
the arrest would serve as the prior valid intrusion. Instead, the court quoted Sweeting v. State, 5 Md. App. 623, 627-28, 249 A.2d 195, 198 (1969), a pre-Coolidge
Maryland case which propounds the open view doctrine.
Similar confusion occurs in Roop v. State, l3 Md. App. 251, 283 A.2d 198
(1971). In Roop, police stopped a car that was trying to evade them. As an officer
approached, he observed a quantity of stereo equipment in the car. The occupants
of the car were arrested for housebreaking. The car was searched and evidence was
seized after the car was brought to the station. The court of special appeals held the
arrest and subsequent search and seizure unconstitutional because the police lacked
the probable cause belief that the defendants committed a felony. In attempting to
analyze the case under the plain view doctrine, the court mistakenly referred to a
classic open view observation where, without a search, an officer sees objects in plain
view within a motor vehicle of such a nature as to give him probable cause to believe
that the vehicle harbors that which is subject to seizure- whether it be contraband
or the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidences of crime. /d. at 260, 283 A.2d at 203.
288 Md. 502, 419 A.2d 1041 (1980).
Liichow v. State, 288 Md. 502, 504, 419 A.2d 1041, 1042 (1980).
/d. at 504-05, 419 A.2d at 1042-43.
/d. at 505-06, 419 A.2d at 1043-44.
/d. at 509, 419 A.2d at 1045.
/d. at 513, 419 A.2d at 1047. The court also excluded the evidence in reliance on
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). Liichow v. State, 288 Md. 502, 510-13,
419 A.2d 1041, 1046-4 7 ( 1980). In Sanders, the Supreme Court held that a suitcase
could be seized from an automobile if the police had probable cause to believe the
suitcase contained contraband, but that the suitcase could be searched only after
obtaining a warrant. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 767. On this authority, the Liichow court
held that the officer was permitted to seize the bag, but that he was prohibited from
searching it without a warrant because of the defendant's reasonable expectation of
privacy in the bag. Liichow, 288 Md. at 512, 419 A.2d at 1046.
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contraband. 103
Although the Liichow court acknowledged the requirements of the
plain view doctrine by quoting an excerpt from Coolidge, 104the court
never discussed the prior valid intrusion element. The dissent asserted,
however, that the prior valid intrusion requirement was "plainly satisfied" because the officer was lawfully on the premises in the course of his
police duties. 105 This position is erroneous, however, because the observation of the tablets constituted merely an open view observation. A legitimate right to see the contents of an opened bag is not a prior valid
intrusion unless there is some further legal authority to invade the receptacle's interior. Thus, neither the Liichow majority nor the dissent provides any valid constitutional basis for the officer's warrantless search of
the seized plastic bag. 106

B.

Inadvertency

Maryland, in conformity with the majority view, has accepted the
inadvertency requirement as an indispensable element of the plain view
exception. 107 Application of the inadvertency requirement by Maryland
courts, however, is both confusing and inconsistent.
103. The dissent argued that the tablets were seized properly under the plain view doctrine because the officer had probable cause to believe the tablets were a controlled
dangerous substance. Liichow, 288 Md. at 514-15, 419 A.2d at 1047-48. Indeed, in
Brown, decided three years after Liichow, the Supreme Court cautioned against interpreting "immediately apparent" to mean the officer must be possessed of "near
certainty" as to the seizable nature of the items. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741
(1983). Moreover, in the recent case of Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987),
the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that probable cause was sufficient to satisfy
the immediately apparent requirement. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153.
At least one state has construed the immediately apparent requirement under
its state constitution more strictly than the Supreme Court construes the requirement. See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 235, 471 A.2d 347, 352-54 (1983). The
Court of Appeals of Maryland has taken the position that Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights must be read in conjunction with the fourth amendment.
Liichow, 288 Md. at 509 n. I, 419 A.2d at 1044-45 n.l. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court's perception of the "immediately apparent" requirement probably would be
accepted by the court of appeals in interpreting the Maryland constitution.
104. /d. at 513, 419 A.2d at 1047 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
466 (1971)).
105. Liichow, 288 Md. at 519, 419 A.2d at 1050.
106. Even under the Supreme Court view in Andreas and Jacobsen that privacy interests
in closed containers may be lost because of prior inspections, the officer's fortuitous
glimpse into the bag did not eliminate the defendant's further legitimate expectations of privacy in his possessions. Liichow might be decided differently today based
on United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Under Ross, an officer with a probable cause belief that contraband is hidden in an automobile can search the entire
vehicle and its contents. Thus, in a situation similar to Liichow, if the bag was
already in the vehicle, the officer could search the car and its contents in search of
contraband and seize the evidence under the plain view doctrine.
107. State v. Boone, 284 Md. I, 10, 393 A.2d 1361, 1366 (1978); State v. Wilson, 279 Md.
189, 195, 367 A.2d 1223, 1227-28 (1977); Smith v. State, 33 Md. App. 407, 410-11,
365 A.2d 53, 55-56 (1976).
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In 1972, the court of special appeals determined in Brown v. State 108
that the inadvertency requirement should be applied narrowly where police have probable cause to obtain a search warrant. 109 This approach
logically limits plain view seizures to evidence for which a warrant could
not be obtained. Cases following Brown, however, appear to apply a different standard.
In Waine v. State, 110 for example, the police obtained a warrant to
search a murder suspect's residence, but seized evidence that was not
listed in the warrant. 111 The court condoned seizure of the unlisted items
because the police had plain view of the unlisted items. 112 Because the
police had prior probable cause to believe the unlisted items would be
discovered during the search, however, the items could have been specified in the warrant. Therefore, the court's reliance on plain view is misplaced; the inadvertency requirement bars warrantless seizures in
circumstances where a warrant could have been obtained. Given the officers' probable cause belief that the evidence would be discovered among
the suspect's possessions, the discovery was anticipated. The court in
Waine apparently considered the inadvertency requirement to be merely
a means of preventing conscious subterfuge of the warrant requirement.
The court did not consider the requirement as excluding evidence that
should have been named in the warrant but was mistakenly omitted. 113
One year later, the court of special appeals reached a similar result
in Briscoe v. State. 114 In Briscoe, the police seized a shotgun that was not
listed in the warrant authorizing the search of a rape suspect's residence.115 The court held that the shotgun fell within the general language of the warrant, which provided for the seizure of "all evidence and
paraphenalia found which may be in connection with purported violations of the aforementioned crimes statutes." 116 On alternative grounds,
the court found the warrantless seizure valid under the plain view exception. 117 The court found the discovery of the shotgun inadvertent even
108. Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 292 A.2d 762 (1972).
109. /d. at 608 n.39, 292 A.2d at 776 n.39 (quoting The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85
HARV. L. REV. 3, 250 (1971)). The Brown court's holding, that the plain view
doctrine did not apply, was based not upon the inadvertency requirement, but upon
the lack of prior valid intrusion. /d. at 612-13, 292 A.2d at 778.
110. 37 Md. App. 222, 377 A.2d 509 (1977).
Ill. Waine v. State, 37 Md. App. 222, 237, 377 A.2d 509, 519 (1977).
112. /d. at 238, 377 A.2d at 519.
113. The opinion implies that the omission of the unlisted items from the warrant was an
oversight, not deliberate.
114. 40 Md. App. 120, 388 A.2d 153, cert. denied, 283 Md. 730 (1978).
115. Briscoe v. State, 40 Md. App. 120, 130, 388 A.2d 153, 159, cert. denied, 283 Md.
730 (1978).
116. /d. A supporting affidavit specifically stated that a shotgun had been used during
the robbery. /d. at 124, 388 A.2d at 156.
117. The court summarized the plain view requirements:
For the warrantless seizure to be constitutionally valid under the plain
view doctrine, however, it must be established that the police had prior
justification for an intrusion into the area searched, that the police inad-
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though it could have been listed in the search warrant because the omission was a good faith error. 118 The court invoked the plain view exception presumably because it believed inadvertency is required only for the
purpose of deterring pretextual intrusions. Although that position is
consistent with Waine, it is inconsistent with Brown.
In Norwood v. State, 119 the court of special appeals resumed its adherence to the view expressed in Brown. In Norwood, a warrant was
issued for the seizure of certain evidence from a suspected rapist's residence. During the search, officers seized several keys not mentioned in
the warrant. The suspect was believed to have entered the victim's apartment with a pass key. The defendant claimed that the discovery of the
keys was anticipated and therefore not inadvertent. 120 The court characterized the argument as "a catch 22" situation:
The short answer to this is simply that appellant confuses his
probable causes. Because there had been no signs of forced entry into the locked apartment, the officer had "probable cause"
to believe that a pass key afforded the unlawful entry and
would thus be evidence associated with the crime. His expression of a belief that the key or keys would be in Howard's
apartment may have been a reasonable suspicion based upon
other evidence of Howard's culpability, but it fell short of constituting "probable cause" to obtain a warrant to search for it
(or them). When upon lawful entry under the warrant the keys
appeared in plain view they were, in light of the foregoing circumstances, "probably" those used to gain entrance and were
therefore properly seized. 121
Thus, under Norwood, the test for inadvertency is whether probable
cause exists prior to entry. 122 Under either Waine or Briscoe, however,

118.

119.
120.
121.
122.

vertently came across the item seized, and that it was 'immediately apparent' to the police that the item seized was evidence.
/d. at 131, 388 A.2d at 159-160 (quoting Smith v. State, 33 Md. App. 407,410, 365
A.2d 53, 55 (1976)).
Where a robbery victim has not informed authorities of every item taken from him,
plain view may validate the seizure of an unlisted stolen object. People v. Boyd, 123
Misc. 2d 634,640,474 N.Y.S.2d 661, 667 (1984). In that situation, police discovery
is unexpected. In Briscoe, however, police knew the suspect used a shotgun in the
commission of the crime.
55 Md. App. 503, 462 A.2d 93 (1983).
Norwood v. State, 55 Md. App. 503, 507-09, 462 A.2d 93, 96 (1983).
/d. at 509, 462 A.2d at 96.
The court's conclusion that the keys could not have been named in the warrant
because the police lacked the probable cause belief that the keys would be found at
the defendant's residence is startling. Assuming there was probable cause to believe
the suspect entered the victim's apartment with a pass key, it is logical to believe
that a pass key might be secreted in the suspect's home. If the use of a pass key
were pure speculation, there would have been no basis for associating the key with
criminal conduct. Thus, in upholding the seizure, the court was compelled to reach
the strained conclusion that although the police had probable cause to believe a
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the discovery of the keys would have been inadvertent because there was
no evidence of bad faith on the part of the police.
The uncertainty created by these conflicting decisions is apparent in
the dissenting opinion in the subsequent case of Ross v. State. 123 In Ross,
a search warrant called for the seizure of "obscene, erotic and pornographic material." 124 The majority held that the seizure of an obscene
videotape not listed in the warrant did not fall within the plain view exception because the officers lacked a reasonable belief that the videotape
was evidence of a crime. 125 The dissent argued that the videotape was
within the scope of the warrant's description and, even if it were not, the
seizure was permissible under the plain view doctrine. 126 Under Norwood, discovery is anticipated if there is probable cause to include the
object in a warrant. The Ross dissent appears to reject the Norwood
probable cause standard for inadvertency in favor of the Waine-Briscoe
interpretation of inadvertency under which a discovery is inadvertent unless there is evidence of bad faith or an attempt to subvert the warrant
requirement. It is still not resolved, however, whether the Norwood probable cause approach or the Waine-Briscoe good faith approach is the law
in Maryland. Of the two positions, the Norwood approach is preferable
because, as an objective approach, it is more workable and logical. The
evaluation of inadvertency on the basis of good faith is nebulous and
impractical.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite a significant shift in the theoretical underpinnings of the
plain view doctrine and significant modification of the original principles
articulated in Coolidge, the doctrine provides a viable basis for warrantless seizures. Where police officers discover incriminating evidence inadvertently while properly on the premises, the plain view doctrine
appropriately allows such evidence to be admitted at trial. In such situations, the requirement of a warrant would not serve to deter wrongful
police activity; rather it would serve to exclude relevent evidence that is
fortuitously acquired.
Unfortunately, however, several key issues concerning the nature
and extent of the plain view doctrine remain unresolved. Courts, including those in Maryland, have misinterpreted the prior valid intrusion requirement by failing to recognize that entry into areas supporting an
interest in privacy, such as houses, cars, or containers, may not be based
only upon an open view. An independent legitimate basis for a search
must precede any plain view seizure. Additionally, courts in Maryland
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master key was used, they had no probable cause to believe the keys were in the
suspect's residence.
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/d. at 261-62, 475 A.2d at 486-87.
Jd. at 273, 475 A.2d at 492 (Garrity, J., dissenting).
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and elsewhere have displayed a lack of consistency in applying the inadvertency requirement. Courts have failed to clarify whether discovery
before the intrusion satisfies the inadvertency requirement, whether lack
of probable cause is required for inadvertency, or whether good faith
omissions from a warrant are sufficient. Until the prior valid intrusion
requirement is honored and the parameters of inadvertence clearly
drawn, the scope of the plain view doctrine will remain uncertain.

